Dear Brethren;

It has been said -- “Give to God the things that belong to God, and Caesar the things that belong to him, and to the Black Race the things that belong to us.” This PCEC Supplemental Informercial Newsletter is designed to nudge the Black Race toward the realization that the slavers, the Euro-Americans & Arabs have developed a fanatical, pseudo-prophet-ideal cultures which are incompatible with the Black Race. And as such we must take racial sovereignty serious. Above are pictures depicting the history of the slave trade. Below are narratives depicting -- the launching of the deplorable state of things in the Congo today, -- the economic situation not only in Barbados but throughout the African World, and the history of Euro-American postcolonial governmental system.

1. Excerpts from Lumumba Speaks
2. An editorial from a newspaper -- The Barbados ADVOCATE, entitled Let’s Get Our Act Together. and

Our objective is to offer the global African Family information that will lead to a PostColonial Cultural & Economic Conference that ultimately will become an Africa for African Fail Safe Cultural and Economic system.

A Postcolonial Fail Safe system is needed

- To break the power of alien aggression, against Black people.
- To eradicate Black on Black infighting and wars.
- At the same time the cure the global African Family of colonial psychosis (A severe mental disorder induced by the authors of the African Slave Trade in which many Black individuals lost contact with reality. The cure perhaps will be found if the global African Family re-adopt and adapt to a Race First philosophy -- a far-reaching cultural & economic racial ideology defined as Africa for Africans. But first let us remember Patrice Lumumba.

Patrice Émery Lumumba (2 July 1925 – 17 January 1961) was a Congolese independence leader and the first legally elected Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo after he helped win its independence from Belgium in June 1960. Only twelve weeks later, Lumumba’s government was deposed in a coup during the Congo Crisis. He was subsequently imprisoned and executed by firing squad, an act that was committed with the assistance of the U. N. the government of Belgium, and others.
Excerpts from Lumumba Speaks

But even if he had managed to rejoin the largest group of his followers, is it likely that he would have been able to recapture the Bakongo capital without striking a blow? With what forces? It seems most probable that Lumumba would have remained in Stanleyville without either winning or losing and that Kasavubu would have reaped the credit of having labeled this return of centralism to its geographical roots a "provincial secession." Objectively, as a matter of fact, the undertaking would have divided the Congolese even further and broken up the country even more, since Lumumba lacked sufficient means to carry it through to the very end. It must be admitted, however, that at this point Lumumba had only two alternatives: he could either accept federation and the autonomy of the Lower Congo, or flee to Stanleyville to prepare to win the country back. In either case federalism would win the day. The truth is that federalism had won the battle before it even began. In politics what is necessary is not always what is possible. Unity, the powerful idea behind the Congolese National Movement, a modern party and one conceived in the image and likeness of European movements, was necessary to the Congo: without it, independence was a dead letter. But at this moment in its history, the European did not really seem to the Congolese to fit their needs; simpler and more solid ties bound them to their native soil, to their ethnic group. Centralization represented only the class-consciousness of the centralized, that is to say the évolus. (Évolué is defined as an "educated native" who has "gotten somewhere.") These remarks lead us to the second characteristic feature of independence: it was an independence that had been more or less freely granted them. In fact, had the Congolese had to fight for it, it would have been inconceivable for Minister Ganshof, simply because he was the Belgian minister, to have chosen the Congolese best qualified to form a government. Lumumba was aware of this and suffered because of it: several times before June 30, he insisted that the Belgian minister leave. At a press conference, he stated:

"Nowhere in the world have we ever seen the former [colonial] power organize and oversee the elections marking the independence of a country. There is no precedent for this in Africa. When Belgium forcibly won its independence in 1830, it was the Belgians themselves who first set up a provisional government. . . ."

Forcibly won: the italics are mine, because this is the whole point; this is what explains the paternalistic tone of the speech King Baudouin made on June 30: we're making you a present of a nice little tov; don't break it. It also explains the apathy of Kasavubu, who had learned what the king's speech was going to be like and limited himself to cutting an overly servile peroration out of his own speech. Indignant at this, Lumumba suddenly grabbed the microphone. We are all familiar with the admirable "statement of the reasons for our bitterness" that he proceeded to deliver in reply to the smug young king. But this is not the heart of the matter, which I for my part find in the lines that immediately precede it:

"Though this independence of the Congo is today being proclaimed through mutual agreement with Belgium, a friendly country with which we are dealing as one equal deals with another, no Congolese worthy of the name can ever forget that we fought to win it, a fight waged each and every day, a passionate and idealistic fight, a fight in which there was not one effort, not one suffering, not one privation, not one drop of blood that we ever spared ourselves."

The stenographic record bears the notation "applause" at this point, which is sufficient proof that the speaker had struck a sensitive nerve. No matter what their party, the Congolese who attended the ceremony did not want to be handed a gift: freedom cannot be given; it must be forcibly taken. To turn these terms around, it can be seen that an independence that is conceded is merely slavery in another guise. The Congolese had suffered for almost a century; they had often been beaten, and strikes and uprisings had become more and more frequent despite cruel repression. How is it that today things are no better, in many ways they remain the same.

Let’s Get Our Act Together

Barbados Advocate 10/14/2012

"SOMETIMES it is hard to imagine that the Caribbean, blessed with what is said to be an array of renewable energy and energy systems, remains trapped in a state of having to fork out enormous sums annually for energy imports. Therefore, when Prime Minister Freundel Stuart suggested that regional countries come together to combat the high costs of petroleum products, it implied that more can be done to correct this sad state of affairs of consuming high-cost energy.

Mr. Stuart, who addressed the Sixth Annual Distinguished Alumni Lecture last Wednesday evening at the University of the West Indies Cave Hill, said that in Barbados, imported petroleum products were accounting for at least six per cent of this country’s gross domestic product. The reality is that in 2011 Barbados’ energy import bill was in excess of $700 million. With instability existing with international oil prices and in the main sources of that commodity, the oil-importing countries’ energy bill will increase further.

It has long been recognised that the days of cheap oil, that is, oil at US$30 a barrel or less, are long gone. With the political instability still very prevalent in the Middle East where the bulk of the world’s oil imports originate, then collaboration or pursuing energy reduction policies has to be given priority.

The Prime Minister reasoned that the need to forge collaborative links with sister CARICOM countries in order to combat the challenge is self-evident. While he did not say this, the record will show nonetheless that collectively, Caribbean Community countries, with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname, are paying more than $12 billion a year for energy imports. (See UNIA-ACL Page 3)
. When it is considered that regional economies are finding the going very rough in this present global economic turmoil, then these countries have no choice but to come together to deal with this subject of high energy costs. What is very interesting is that they do have the wherewithal to do so since there are enormous energy resources in the region.

It is known that Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname, and to some extent Belize and Barbados are oil-producing states, although the last two do not come close to the others, and especially Trinidad and Tobago. There is an abundance of hydroelectric power in Guyana and also in Suriname, and geothermal energy in some of the other territories, notably in Grenada, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis.

What therefore is holding up the Caribbean collaborating in the area of energy and renewable energy projects that would bring them both social and economic benefits? For some time now we have been hearing about a proposed pipeline project whereby Trinidad and Tobago will be selling its natural gas to Barbados, St. Lucia and Dominica. This project is very much welcomed. Assuming that this project gets off the ground, both Trinidad and Tobago and the recipient countries stand to benefit – Trinidad by being assured of a market for its natural gas and the others by putting it to good use, like in the case of Barbados generating electricity and the eventual lowering of the cost of it to consumers. But more needs to be done. We repeat – the days of cheap oil are over.

In the meantime, to survive in this global economy, the Caribbean has to be more efficient and competitive in dealing with the rest of the world. If energy has the potential to make us more efficient, then we have to do what the Prime Minister is suggesting.

**The New Tyranny**

By Franz Borkenau, 1900 – 1957

Franz Borkenau was an Austrian writer. Borkenau was born in Vienna, Austria. As a university student in Leipzig, his main interests were Marxism and psychoanalysis. Borkenau is known as one of the pioneers of the totalitarianism theory.

**Moloch of Totalitarianism** – memorial of victims of repressions exercised by totalitarian regimes, at Levashovo, Saint Petersburg.

“The question of immediate practical importance with which we are confronted is therefore that of the stability of the Nazi political regime. Is the development of a dictatorship of the Nazi type as inevitable an outcome of the development of modern society as economic collectivism is? If that be so, then it will not matter very much who are the rulers. It is the type of regime, not the personalities at the head, which really matters. If the sort of totalitarian regime which we had in the 1940’s in Russia and Germany is something inevitable, then we were fighting against historical necessity. Whatever the outcome of the war, our fight will then in the end prove to have been pointless. On the other hand, if a regime of the Nazi type is not inevitable, it is important to know what alternatives exist.

The answers to all these queries are not of the type of a simple Yes or No. There are degrees of inevitability. Economic collectivism, to take one example, is an inevitable result of modern competitive business methods. But it could be made to work for aims entirely different from those of the Nazis, and as a result would change its shape, become much less belligerent, and really something entirely different from what it is in the hands of the Nazis. Distress of the traditional forms of Christianity and humanitarianism is again something with deep roots, but that is not the same as pretending that the Nazi ideology is necessary. There is in every human action, and more emphatically in everything concerning human society, an element of unavoidable necessity, and an element of free choice. Social science, to a large extent, aims at finding the border-line between the two. That applies to politics as much as to any other sphere of social life.

The facts are generally known regarding the particulars important for an understanding of the Nazi political system. What follows will be therefore largely a resume, and the same facts will appear again, though from a different angle. As the Nazi economic regime is a direct outcome of the collapse of German capitalism, as its ideology is a direct outcome of the collapse of traditional Christianity, so the Nazi political regime is a direct outcome of the collapse of democracy in Germany. We have traced a national and an international aspect of Nazism in every other sphere, and we must do the same for the political sphere. The collapse of democracy in Germany is undoubtedly an incident in an international crisis of democracy. But that it should have been so complete in Germany is due to special German conditions.

We shall not attempt to separate these two aspects very strictly, because what seems to me to be the main reason of the collapse of German democracy is something which applies to all countries, but to Germany and to the countries of southern and eastern Europe much more than to the countries of the West. It can be reduced to a very simple formula. The smooth working of democracy is dependent upon a considerable degree of unity of views of all essential sections of the community.

(See UNIA-ACL Page 5)
FROM BLACK POWER TO HIP HOP
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Our modern democracy has developed towards a state of constantly increasing political tension, which in various degrees has brought democratic institutions to a standstill. The reasons for this development are not far to seek. In the first place, we are not quite accurate in speaking of democracy as something which has worked satisfactorily for many decades, until gradually it had developed an increasing degree of friction. Democracy, by common consent, is defined as a political regime in which all adult citizens take an equal share in the election of representative institutions in which ultimate political power is vested. Students of public law will at once observe that literally dozens of objections can be raised against such a definition, and that, if this is democracy, then it does not fully exist anywhere. All such objections may be granted, but then our problem simply is to investigate those types of government, which come nearest to the democratic ideal.

Let us take manhood suffrage as a standard of democracy. It is then seen that (beside South American republics, where representative government was hardly a reality) manhood suffrage, before the last war, only existed in the U.S.A., in France, Switzerland, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries. It had been introduced in Italy in 1913, with the definite intention of making the 'management' of elections easier, through giving the vote to the illiterate majority. It was introduced in Great Britain in 1918. In Austria and Germany it had been a sham because it did not go together with real representative government, and was only applied to the national, not to the provincial and municipal representations. This was changed both in Germany and the Successor States of the old Austrian Empire in 1918. Russia never had a democratic government.

In the Scandinavian Countries and in Holland manhood suffrage antedated the last war only by a few years. In some parts of Switzerland it had age-long traditions, together with the ineretate practice of direct legislation of the people through referendum. But then the problems of the Swiss cantons were mostly of a simple and local character. Manhood suffrage in France dates back to 1871, to the foundation of the Third Republic, but was run on lines peculiar to France, and which for a very long time preserved the French Republic from some of the most difficult problems of the present day. It would take too long to go into details, but the substance of the French peculiarities is this, that in France there exists nothing similar to the political parties in other countries. French elections to this day are contests much more between individuals than between groups. The importance of the point will soon emerge. But the upshot of it is, that the United States of America is the only country which has had full democratic government for more than one generation.

The fact is, that the tradition of political liberty (or Liberalism) is much older than the tradition of political equality (or democracy) in our Western world. In Protestant countries Liberalism emerged almost as a natural product of the Reformation (Lutheran countries excepted), whereas in the Catholic world it dates back to the French Revolution. Liberty of opinion, liberty of association and of the Press, the rule of law and representative government, have all gradually developed since the seventeenth century, and some of them date back even earlier. It is this liberal tradition, and not so much any tradition of political equality, which has deep roots in our Western society.

We are used to think of democracy, of political equality, as a complement and as a completion of political liberty. In countries with a liberal tradition, therefore, one constantly meets with the statement that the Nazi and Bolshevik regimes are undemocratic and anti-democratic. Liberals are left gaping when Nazi and Stalin propagandists maintain in full sincerity that Nazidom and the Stalin regime are 'true' democracies. Yet such statements are not so much beside the point as may appear at first sight.

'Democracy's in Nazi Germany and in Stalin's Russia has certainly very little in common with the thing described by the same name in Britain, the United States, and France. Yet the claim of the totalitarian countries to be truly democratic has a meaning. An understanding of totalitarianism depends to a large extent on the comprehension of this meaning.

Liberalism and democracy are not so closely connected as may appear. There are points of contact, but there are factors making for friction as well. Liberalism is rooted in the struggle for the protection of the individual against the spiritual and secular tyranny of absolute kings. Liberalism is primarily concerned with the limitation of the power of the State over the individual. But the same does not apply to democracy. A full-fledged democracy would be a regime where the majority, through their representatives, could carry through their will against any minority. And protection of a minority against the will of the majority infringes the basic principle of democracy, that the majority shall rule, and constitutes a privilege for the minority. In simple words, that means that democracy can be as tyrannical as an autocrat. And this is not a mere figment of the imagination; it is to a very large extent the case with the Nazis and with the Communists. There is more. There exists a very close connection between the extreme forms of mob rule and the extreme forms of autocratic tyranny. In our own times we have experienced this connection. The Nazi regime is undoubtedly a tyrannical autocracy. But at the same time it is undoubtedly mob rule. That such a thing should exist seemed almost unbelievable a few years ago; yet it is not at all a new thing. It was a fact well known to both ancient Greeks and Romans that democracy, when driven to the extreme,
was apt to degenerate into mob rule; and they knew very well that there was only one end to mob rule: a tyrannical autocracy. They were inclined to regard the tyranny of an individual as a simple political form of the domination of the lowest elements of society. The political theories of Aristotle need some modification before being applied to our modern world. But the substance of his contention still holds good.

Nazism is an autocracy; the Tudor regime in England was an autocracy. But the mere mention of the two regimes in one sentence makes one feel that there is a profound difference between one autocracy and another. The old paternal autocracies aimed at keeping the subject out of politics. Politics were the business of the sovereign and his advisers, and for the subject to meddle in politics was regarded as criminal. That was a state of things which never fully obtained in England, though the Tudor autocracy aimed at reaching it. It very fully obtained on the Continent, until far into the nineteenth century. It still obtains in a great many countries of the Near and Far East which are living under so-called dictatorships. But the dictatorship which to-day exists in Rumania or Persia (in the forms of monarchy) profoundly differs from the Nazi and Communist dictatorships. The latter owe their existence to a revolutionary mass movement which has brought them into power, and on whose support they rely. The former are essentially conservative, which in those countries implies being non-democratic.

It is very important to see this clearly, because factors of great international importance, such as the attitude of Italy, cannot be correctly understood without it. Between a revolutionary autocracy and a conservative autocracy, there is a world of difference. Yet in the general blurring of outlines which is so characteristic of our period the one shades constantly into the other. Revolutionary dictatorships, and particularly the Nazis, have tried and still try to masquerade as conservative powers. Conservative dictatorships, if threatened, have sought the backing of Fascist mass movements. Occasionally dictatorships, as in the case of Italy, have been brought into power by a revolutionary mass movement, but have then turned conservative. At least in one case, in Spain, a dictatorship has been brought in through an alliance of conservative and Fascist forces. In many cases it is difficult in the beginning to determine the real character of a dictatorship, because in our modern world the pure type of paternal autocracy, the complete exclusion of the masses from all political activity, is impossible. That type of regime could only exist while there were no newspapers and no wireless. Therefore even the most conservative movement to-day aims at enlisting mass support, and in doing so easily acquires a flavor of Fascism. The ultimate test, however, comes a few years after dictatorship has come into power. After a time a regime must decide whether it is going to overthow the traditional upper classes or to keep them in power. In Germany the decision has gone emphatically in a revolutionary direction. In Italy and Spain it has gone emphatically in the conservative direction. In Germany the Nazis are sweeping away the old aristocracy, bourgeoisie, civil service, and clergy. In Italy the new Fascist guard has merged with the old rulers. In Spain the preponderance of the old conservative groups is not seriously challenged by the Fascist movement. That is the fundamental reason for the difficulties in the way of a close alliance between Germany and the two Mediterranean powers.

Nazism, then, is an extreme form of revolutionary democracy which has brought forth an equally revolutionary autocracy. But we cannot be satisfied with this general statement. What is the development which, in modern society, leads from Liberalism to extremes of democracy, to Fascist mass movements, and finally to a Fascist autocracy? And why did this development take place so violently in Germany?

*We have already said that democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is a very recent phenomenon in our Western world. It came into being in connection with what the Marxists describe as the class struggle. It was regarded by the lower classes, and especially by the industrial workers, as a means of gaining political influence. Manhood suffrage all over the world, with the exception of the United States, France, and Switzerland, has come into existence under pressure from the Labour movement. It can almost be regarded as an incident in the struggle of the working classes for their social, economic, and political rights. But we have already noted that the class struggle itself was to a large extent a result of the growing intervention of the State in economic matters. The attempts of various groups to influence the machinery of legislation arose from the fact that it was the instrument for enacting measures of protection. The main social groups accordingly organized in political parties along the lines of their economic interests. These economic interests were a good deal more complicated than had been foreshadowed in Marxist theory, and nowhere did political divisions correspond to a simple antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Yet it is quite undeniable that

(See UNIA-ACL Page 7)
In our modern democratic mass parties, economic interests play a predominant role.

At present this seems so obvious to us that we hardly realize that in the hey-day of Liberalism the fact would have been regarded as outrageous. The rigid division of the masses along political lines was unknown. Politics, in the mid-Victorian era, were still on the whole an affair of the select few. Political families had their age-long allegiances, but the masses did not regard themselves as consistently belonging to this or that party. Parties were supposed to stand for principles, not for interests. And it would in fact be difficult to say what interests in England divided Conservatives and Liberals, between the abolition of the Corn Laws and the first agitation for Protective Tariffs. The same facts lay at the bottom of the apparently different procedure of American and French politics. In England, during the hey-day of Liberalism, parties were divided, not by interests, but by principles, which allowed of a very great deal of interpretation. In the United States, after the Civil War, parties were at best divided by historical memories, if by anything. In France parties were shadows of names, and the real fight was between local coteries. All this was quite logical during the period when the State interfered very little with economic interests.

It must be admitted that those were ideal conditions for representative government. In the absence of strong antagonisms of interest, political parties had then nothing of the rigidity of programme and discipline they have today, and their following changed continually. All political parties, therefore, showed extreme adaptability and flexibility. The business of government, small in itself compared with present conditions, was never brought to a standstill. In England the only subject involving serious dissension was for a long time the Irish question. And it is noteworthy that even this question, which compared with our modern conditions must appear as insignificant, tended repeatedly to bring parliamentary procedure to a standstill. The attitude of the Irish proved that even safe parliamentary majorities are unable to overcome the staunch resistance of a minority fighting its cause with real bitterness. And the most significant fact about the Parnell agitation was that the basic rule of English political life, the flexibility of programmes and of the following of the various parties, did not apply to Ireland. The Parnellites, though a minority, were redoubtable because they had all Catholic Ireland safely behind them for a settled policy.

Perhaps the simplest way of stating the modern position which threatens representative government is to say that nowadays all political parties tend more and more to behave as the Parnellites behaved in the eighties of the last century. The statement obviously applies in widely varying degrees to various countries and to various parties. In France, outside the ranks of the Moscow Communists, there still hardly exists anything of the type of modern democratic mass parties. In the United States Roosevelt's New Deal has for the first time introduced into American politics a serious cleavage along social lines such as had not existed since the end of the Civil War. Yet that cleavage corresponds so little to the traditional party lines that American politics at present suffer more from the general uncertainty than from too much rigidity of party divisions. In England political parties are divided along class lines, but the division is very far from absolute; issues other than economic ones still play a considerable part, and a considerable section of the electorate changes its allegiance with every General Election. But in all the other countries with a democratic government party divisions have become excessively rigid.

This was particularly the case in democratic Germany. Proportional representation made the stalemate worse, but only because the swing of the electorate was so small. In the English electoral system considerable changes in representation sometimes occur with very little change in the distribution of votes. That is never the case under proportional representation. But where changes in the electorate are considerable proportional representation is no obstacle to their expression, as the rise of the Nazis in Germany shows. The stalemate of democratic government which arose in many Continental countries was not due to any technicalities of the electoral law, but to the rigidity of the party allegiances of the various groups of the electorate.

These allegiances were certainly not determined by economic interests only. In Germany and in Holland, to take two instances, the Catholic parties cut right across the economic party divisions. But then the allegiance of the Catholic minorities in Protestant countries to their respective parties was even more rigid than other party allegiances. And on the whole, with the exception of the Catholic problem, party allegiances were substantially determined by economic interests.

The preponderance of questions of interest over questions of principle assumed disastrous dimensions, especially in Germany. The larger divisions of interest, such as those between the 'bourgeoisie' and the 'proletariat', imply a great many questions of principle. But in Germany, as in some other countries, political parties tended to divide and subdivide, until the various groups were not more than the representatives of the narrow vested interests of narrow groups.

(See UNIA-ACL Page 8)

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This was partly due to the eclipse of the traditional ideals of the old Prussian-German Empire. But it was due, to an even larger extent, to the increasing interference of the State in economic matters.

It must be recognized that the stalemate in the working of democratic institutions was closely connected with the growth of State Socialism. The more State intervention there is, the more directly everybody's income is determined by legislation. To exert pressure upon the legislature on behalf of their vested interests then becomes almost as much a necessary job to be done for the sake of maintaining a family budget as keeping one's books or going to work every morning. Under such conditions all political parties prove increasingly intractable and unamenable to compromise. Everybody is agreed, in the abstract, that in a country of many parties government can only be conducted by constant compromises between them. But to the electorate every compromise appears as a betrayal of their most immediate everyday interests expressed in X s. d., and they respond by joining some irresponsible opposition party. The business of government has become too important for every individual to allow of any coolness and detachment on the part of the ordinary man. Therefore, while parties divide and subdivide along lines of vested interests, government through compromise becomes at the same time increasingly imperative and increasingly difficult. This is the reason why the rise of State interference threatens all democratic institutions.

The situation was not improved by the fact that many Continental party leaders regarded this state of things as an ideal form of democracy. This view was particularly rampant in the Labour movement. The two most outstanding leaders of the Austrian Socialist Party, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, praised these developments as the emergence of a new type of democracy, baptized it 'functional democracy', and regarded it as a more real type of democracy than the merely formal type of pre-war times. For, they argued, under the new type of democracy every section of the people could make the weight of their claims felt in the balance of political forces. The political parties were no longer electoral organizations only. They had permeated every aspect of life; employers' organizations, cooperatives, and trade unions had solidly coalesced with political bodies. Organizations for sport and recreation had accepted political allegiances. From birth to death the individual found himself living within the framework of a militant social group. It was impossible by the mere vote of a majority to overrule the claims and wishes of any of these political-economic-cultural groups. Consequently, in 'functional democracy', there could be no tyranny of the majority. It was indeed splendid. Every vested interest was in a position to exert the maximum pressure upon the administration. It only remained to proclaim that government is nothing but the result of compromise between vested interests. But however splendid this theory may appear, there is a flaw in it. The business of government, after all, is very largely to rule over and overrule vested interests. No government could be carried on without constantly injuring all sorts of vested interests in the interest of the community as a whole. For this rule of the government over the parties there is no provision in 'functional democracy'. And it is therefore not a new and progressive type of government, but simply an ingenious method of bringing the business of government to a standstill, and that in a system where the individual depends more upon good government than had been the case for a long time before.

That state of things was not so very apparent during the revolutionary period after the war, because then government on the Continent was very largely a matter of armed force, however much veiled by democratic forms. Yet even during that period the first serious collapse of democracy occurred in Italy. The defects of the system were even less visible during the prosperous years between 1924 and 1929. They became, however, glaring with economic collapse. For the policy of retrenchment which then imposed itself asked for considerable sacrifices from all interests, and none would consent. During that period, in many countries, and especially in Germany, the political parties found themselves faced with the choice of shoudering responsibility and losing their electoral following, or keeping their following by abandoning their share in the government. In Germany, without much hesitation, they chose the second alternative. Parliamentary government in Germany came to an end in 1930 by the nomination of Herr Bruning as Chancellor of the Reich, not by virtue of a parliamentary majority, which he had not, but by virtue of the confidence of President Hindenburg, which he then enjoyed. All parties, in fact, welcomed the new situation, which relieved them from all responsibility at a difficult time.

The business of government, to repeat it, is to rule. A political system exclusively concerned with vested interests is unable to rule. It is inevitable to some extent that such a political system should arise as the outcome of representative democracy combined with State Socialism. And it is therefore inevitable that at some crisis a movement should arise which wants rulers to rule again, and wants something to be done in order to get out of the muddle, even at the price of innumerable injuries done to all sorts of vested interests. Fascism, in that sense, is a movement directed against all vested interests, and if it describes itself as a movement above all classes, it tells the truth. As a reaction against functional democracy Fascism is an intelligible development. That is not to say that it is inevitable, still less that it is commendable. But in order to understand what the conquest of power by Fascism really means we must get one step closer to the actual history of that conquest in
Various countries. The advent of a totalitarian regime is not by any means a mechanical result of a stalemate in the functioning of the Democratic Party system. When the democratic machinery comes to a standstill there is a gap, which must be filled by something. But there is more than one solution to the problem. In fact, a totalitarian regime can never arise as long as democracy functions adequately. But a breakdown of democratic machinery is only one of several conditions for its coming about.

If representative government declines, power almost automatically falls into the hands of the civil service, with or without political interference from the army. This process has been observed in almost every country east of the Rhine. The obvious alternative to parliamentary government is not Fascism but a bureaucratic and military dictatorship. The collapse of democracy inevitably results in attempts at the restoration of some sort of paternal government. We have seen this paternal government maintain itself for a long time with various degrees of success in such countries as Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and several others. An attempt at the restoration of paternal government under Field Marshal Hindenburg as President of the Reich was made by Chancellor Bruning and by his successors, von Papen and von Schleicher, after German democracy had collapsed under the strain and stress of economic crisis.

Why has paternal government been more or less of a success in large areas of eastern Europe, and such a failure in Germany, where it resulted in the conquest of power by the Nazis? The answer is almost implicit in the question. Eastern Europe is an area mostly inhabited by peasants of a low standard of living and of education. To such societies paternal government comes naturally. There was considerable progress in eastern Europe after the last war, and as a result of it the stirring of the desire for self-government, yet democracy in those regions was mainly a foreign import, and a return to paternalism after its premature introduction was not incongruous with the social structure and conditions of that area. But in Germany paternalism was reintroduced into the strongest industrial community of Europe, and one which had been revolutionized from top to bottom.

No wonder, therefore, that the attempt to return to the paternal rule of the Prussian Junkers was a miserable failure. It would be so, in every other modern industrialized country, if after some supposed collapse of democracy the civil service and the army should try to play the part of dictators. For the basic condition for the successful rule of a paternal government is the passive acquiescence of the masses in the fate provided for them by destiny. Of this there was no sign in Germany.

What happened, therefore, was this: the democratic parties fell into complete contempt through their voluntary abdication at the height of the economic crisis. But the paternal government of Field-Marshal Hindenburg and his following of Junkers, officers, and bureaucrats attracted all the hostility which was the natural lot of a government obliged to carry out the most terrific measures of retrenchment; to reduce salaries, wages, doles, national and municipal budgets, and all expenditure of public and private life. Some force directed both against all democratic parties and the paternal government was bound to arise.

There was never a moment in German history when the rulers and the ruled were so completely divided as in 1931 and 1932. The new movement could succeed only on the condition of bringing the rulers and the ruled together again. That might be achieved in various ways. A new type of democracy might have evolved. There might have been a religious movement, changing the whole outlook. But there was Fascism.

The political stage at that moment was strewn with the corpses of the old political movements. And a new movement could only arise out of their debris. At this point a development occurred which might have been foreseen, but was too far outside the traditions of German democracy actually to be foreseen. The new movement of Nazidom coalesced from elements drawn from all classes and from all strata of society. But that is not tantamount to saying that no economic interests had a part in its emergence. The Nazis neatly dissolved the old parties into two elements; the elements most directly struck by the crisis joined the Nazis; those less hit by the crisis kept to their old allegiances. In the Nazi Party there met landowners and industrialists threatened with bankruptcy, young people from the universities who had never a hope of finding jobs, workers from decaying industries, or unemployed, peasants threatened with eviction owing to their inability to pay taxes. The new Volksgemeinschaft, the new national unity of the Nazis, was a unity of classes. This fact is the basic reality for understanding of Nazi mentality and Nazi policy. The Nazi movement consists of desperadoes. That shifted the whole basis of politics. Previously, politics had been a business of tenacious bargaining for petty economic interests. The masses who had become declassed in the tornado of the crisis had no hope left in the ordinary economic life. I do not mean by this that objectively there was no hope for them. On the contrary, economic recovery was bound to come, and would bring with it new opportunities for many of them. But in the diseased state of the country this hope did not seem to be real. The normal world was at an end for them. What people think is to a very high degree determined by their chances of doing something. The old pettifogging function of democracy, with all its drawbacks, had its values in that it set people well-defined and intelligible tasks. Trade-unionism, agricultural cooperatives, and political peasant organizations and the various business groups had built up a tradition of thorough competence in their own spheres, of tenacious fighting, of slow improvement.
progress, and of steadfast mutual solidarity between their members. All that had gone with economic collapse. The vote had be come unimportant with the eclipse of parliamentary government. An armed rising was out of the question, owing to the coherence of the army, and the lack of arms in the hands of the civilian population. The ordinary type of social and political activities had lost its object. The Nazi movement was made up of people who had lost all means of ordinary political and economic activity, and could only trust in a saviour.

It was out of this situation that there grew the specific mentality of the Nazi following, in which an unlimited readiness for fisticuffs was to be found side by side with the stunned indifference of cattle. It was a direct result of the economic crisis; something infinitely less articulate than the official Nazi ideology, a state of mind in which wild fury and a search for a scapegoat were mixed with passive despair and self-abandonment.

It is important to realize that the Nazi clique not only rose to power on the back of such feelings, but that the continuation of their power depends upon the permanence of these same feelings. Economic crisis in Germany has long been superseded by a boom. But the Nazis could never allow the normal psychological effects of economic recovery to make themselves felt. It would be the end of their domination. Therefore, there could never be normality under a Nazi regime. The Nazis managed, in the midst of economic prosperity, to keep their people in a state of semi-starvation and dull misery, broken by outbursts of Messianic hope whipped up by the propaganda machinery. They could not rule under any other conditions.

It is to a very great extent the character of the ruled which determines the character of the rulers; that is the truth which Shakespeare has illustrated in Julius Caesar. No decent rule could be built upon a mob of _declassed_ elements, torn between wild hopes and despair. The Nazi rulers are the necessary complement to the Nazi mob.

The ruling group in Germany share with their following an absolute incapacity for ordinary normal life. But whereas among the masses this incapacity is mainly due to passive despondency, among the ruling group it is a positive principle, as becomes rulers. Among the ruling group it is a positive contempt for normal life (including even normal military life); a revelling in the most desperate type of gambling; a fanatic contempt for ordinary standards of decency. The Nazi ruling group has frequently been described as a 'clique of gangsters. But the description is not quite adequate. Gangsters usually have some amount of clan feeling, of which there is very little among the Nazi rulers, where the most desperate strife prevails. And gangsters on the whole are not so metaphysical; their reluctance to lead an ordinary life is practical; it has not been raised to the dignity of a sort of anti-moral principle.

Nazi anti-moralism social roots are the same as those of the despondency of the Nazi following. They have their origin in the collapse of all traditional hierarchies, all economic security, and all the traditional values. But the important fact remains that among the ruling group positive anti-moralism has taken the place of passive disintegration of the standards of decency. Out of the disintegration of these old standards has grown, among the Nazis, a sort of Satanic religion, which is the principle of their government.

It must be seen that within limits this Satanic religion is an element of political strength. Every country, if subjected to Germany's trials, might produce the same sort of disintegration. But not every country would transform this disintegration into the violent, ruthless, and, within limits, efficient aggressiveness of the Nazis. It is this transformation which has impressed the world, and there have been decent people who have been misled into crediting Germany with a real moral recovery under Nazi rule.

There is no doubt that the ruling Nazi group has vigour. The display of this vigour, the capacity to create something new, however Satanic, out of mere disintegration, is something which I confess I cannot account for in any terms of sociological interpretation. Vigor there is in a society, or there is not. There are countries and groups which have it, and others which have not. It is doubtless related, to some extent, to the age of a civilization, and German civilization in many respects is very young. Yet it is only the event which can prove the strength or absence of regenerative powers in any human society.

But though the vigour of Nazism is beyond doubt, the world, for a time, has been too much impressed with it. It is true that, in order to hit hard, a people must be young and vigorous. But the mere capacity to hit hard does not imply staying power. And it is safe to say that the Nazi eruption, while showing vigour, has demonstrated the deeply diseased state of Germany. It is like a drug administered to a sick man, which may stimulate but certainly at the same time exhausts him.

That is apparent both in the structure of the Nazi guard and in its policy. The Nazi guard has in the main been selected from people who had all the characteristics of the declasses, but reacted to them rather with violence than with despondence. The bulk of the active Nazi element came from people who, after the war, could not find their way back into civil life, and, in order to continue the job of warfare, formed Freicorps to fight in the Baltic, in Silesia, and later on in Turkey, in China, in Bolivia, and indeed wherever there was a fight going on. The depth of the patriotism of many of them was as doubtful as that of the _Landsknechte_ of the sixteenth century, to whom they liked to compare themselves. But their love of fighting was undoubted, though they preferred irregular fighting to regular warfare. Other elements came from the Youth Movement, that deep romantic revolt of the young generation against the dull, bourgeois life of their fathers. Here, too, hostility against the ordinary conditions of civilized life in a modern industrial society was the basic impulse. All sorts of knights of fortune gathered round this nucleus. To visualize the type of people gathering round Hitler one must read Ludecke's _I Knew Hitler._
The leading Nazi group consists almost exclusively of psychopaths of the worst kind. Hitler has certainly a streak of insanity. All through his life, before he became a party leader, he was never able to find an ordinary job. Goering was a drug addict, and is a man with an irresistible urge to violence. Goebbels, a club-foot, has been a failure in every walk of life until he became the viperous slanderer and liar of the Nazis, despised by his own companions. Rbhm, the organizer of the Nazi Terror Guards, was a pervert. Let us be silent about Herr Streicher, Hitler's only personal friend, expert in anti-Semitism and editor of that vile product of sexual perversion, Der Sturmer. That is the group of men who to-day lead what was a great nation.

It is not for the sake of propaganda that facts like these are mentioned. They are essential for the understanding of Nazi politics. Germany to-day is a country led by a group of crazy adventurers, ruling over a people dazed with hysterical fear. She is a country capable of any sort of horror, but incapable of sustained effort. The Nazi guard, and particularly the highest leading group, are not, on the whole, the sort of people who make good fighters. Violent they are, but that is another thing. The essential thing about Nazi expansion is this: that the Nazis have never attacked an adversary at all equal in strength to themselves. They acquired power, not by a fight, but by the complete disintegration of their adversaries. And they are building on the same foundations in their attempt to spread their power beyond the borders of Germany.

Let us repeat it: the Nazi revolution, in all its aspects, was a reaction to disasters which preceded it and which had somehow to be overcome. But the tragedy of Germany, of Europe, and of the world is that Germany was too deeply diseased to react against these disasters in a decent way; that changes, many of them necessary and commendable, have been carried out by a crazy gang brought to the surface by despair and moral collapse; and that this gang has turned even the good things in the new order to disruption and destruction. They are now trying to infect the whole world with their own disease.